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Recent Developments 
I n United States v. Coleman, 158 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 
1998)(en banc), the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit held that a Maryland 
conviction for common-law assault 
may constitute a violent felony 
under the Armed Career Criminal 
Act of 1984 ("ACCA"), 18 
U.S.C.A. § 924(e)(West Supp. 
1998). A Maryland common-law 
assault will be considered a violent 
felony for purposes of the ACCA 
when it has as an element the use, 
attempted use, or threatened use of 
physical force and the crime is 
punishable by imprisonment for a 
term exceeding one year. 
In 1996, Sidney R. Coleman 
("Coleman") was charged with 
felony possession of a firearm in 
violation of 18 U.S.C.A. section 
922. Coleman pled guilty to this 
charge. Pursuant to the ACCA, 
the Government sought sentencing 
enhancement which requires three 
prior violent felony convictions. 
The Government asserted that 
Coleman had been previously 
convicted in Maryland of robbery 
with a deadly weapon in 1983, 
assault in 1988, and attempted 
murder in 1990. The Government 
claimed that the three convictions 
satisfied the requisite violent 
felony conviction element of the 
ACCA. Coleman contended, 
however, that the 1988 conviction 
for assault did not fall within the 
scope of the ACCA because it did 
not have as an element the use, 
attempted use, or threatened use of 
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physical force, and was not 
punishable by imprisonment 
greater than one year. 
The United States District 
Court for the District of Maryland 
rejected Coleman's contention and 
concluded after a review of the 
charging documents of the 1988 
assault conviction that the offense 
was a "violent felony," placing it 
within the scope of the ACCA. 
Finding that Coleman was an 
armed career criminal, the district 
court enhanced his sentence to the 
mandatory fifteen year 
imprisonment as required by the 
ACCA. Coleman appealed to the 
United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit which affirmed. 
To begin its analysis, the court 
of appeals looked to the language 
of the ACCA. Coleman, 158 F.3d 
at 201 (citing 18 U.S.C.A. § 
924(e)(West Supp. 1998». A 
fifteen year minimum sentence is 
mandated by the ACCA for 
"individuals convicted pursuant to 
18 U.S.c.A. § 922(g) who have 
'three previous convictions ... for 
a violent felony or a serious drug 
offense, or both, committed on 
occasions different from one 
another. ", Id (quoting 18 
U.S.c.A. § 924 (e)(1)(West Supp. 
1998». The ACCA defines a 
"violent felony," in pertinent part, 
as "any crime punishable by 
imprisonment for a term exceeding 
one year . . . that -- (i) has as an 
element the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force 
against the person of another." Id 
(quoting 18 U.S.C.A. § 924 
(e)(2)(B». 
The court of appeals then 
considered Coleman's contention 
that under Maryland law, 
common-law assault does not 
necessarily have as an element the 
use, attempted use, or threatened 
use of physical force against 
someone's person. Id The court 
recognized that "[a] Maryland 
conviction for common-law assault 
presents the unusual situation in 
which an offense may be 
committed in one of two ways--
one of which requires the use, 
attempted use, or threatened use of 
physical force and one of which 
does not." Id at 202 (citing United 
States v. Kirksey, 138 F.3d 120, 
125 (4th Cir. 1998». As a result, 
the court declined to find that 
within the meaning of 18 u.s.c.A. 
section 924 (e)(2)(B)(I), a 
Maryland common-law assault 
constitutes a per se violent felony. 
Id 
The court explained that in 
determining whether a conviction 
constitutes a violent felony, "a 
court generally must 'look only to 
the fact of conviction and the 
statutory definition of the prior 
offense.'" Id. at 201 (citing Taylor 
v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 
(1990)). However, "in a certain 
limited number of situations it is 
appropriate for a court to look 
beyond the fact of conviction and 
the elements of the offense in 
deciding whether an offense 
constitutes a violent felony." 
Coleman, 158 F.3d at 202. Where 
an offense could be either 
committed with or without 
physical force, the court explained, 
a district court may look to other 
evidence. Accordingly, the court 
of appeals found the district 
court's approach to be proper 
when it consulted the charging 
papers and "looked beyond the fact 
of conviction and the elements of 
the offense to determine whether 
the particular offense of which 
Coleman was convicted was a 
violent felony." Id. 
As a basis for its 
determination, the court looked to 
the language of Maryland Rule 4-
201(b) which governs charging 
documents. Id. at 202-03. In 
essence, the Maryland charging 
document rule requires a statement 
of charges supported by affidavit 
setting forth probable cause that 
the defendant committed the 
offense charged. Id. at 203. The 
language in the charging papers 
against Coleman asserted that 
"Coleman 'did make an assault on 
PIO Reedy.'" Id. at 202. Finding 
this statement of the formal charge 
to be insufficient to make a 
determination, the district court 
looked to the statement of charges 
containing the affidavit setting 
forth the probable cause. Id. The 
statement of charges "revealed that 
Coleman had pointed a handgun in 
the direction of the officer." Id. at 
203. As a result, the court found 
that the district court's reliance on 
the charging papers and statement 
of charges was sufficient to 
establish that Coleman's assault 
conviction involved the use, 
attempted use, or threatened use of 
physical force against another. Id. 
The final contention by 
Coleman formed the basis for the 
en banc consideration of the appeal 
by the court of appeals. Id. 
Coleman contended that his 
Maryland conviction for common-
law assault did not fit within the 
ACCA because "it [did] not 
constitute a 'crime punishable by 
imprisonment for a term exceeding 
one year.'" Id. (quoting 18 
U.S.C.A. § 924 (e)(2)(B)(West 
Supp. 1998)). Coleman relied on 
the decision in United States v. 
Schultheis, 486 F.2d 1331 (4th Cir. 
1973) in which the court of 
appeals determined that the 
seriousness of the crime is 
determined by the "actual sentence 
imposed." Coleman, 158 F.3d at 
203. Accordingly, Coleman 
asserted that since his sentence for 
the assault was eighteen months, 
with all but six months suspended, 
the conviction should fall under 
the misdemeanor exception of 18 
U.S.C.A. section 
921 (a)(20)(B)which excludes "any 
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State offense classified by the laws 
of the State as a misdemeanor and 
punishable by a term of 
imprisonment of two years or 
less." Id The Government, on the 
other hand, argued the more recent 
case, United States v. Hassan El, 5 
F.3d 726 (4th Cir. 1993), 
established "the common-law 
offense of assault in Maryland is a 
violent felony because it 'clearly is 
punishable by more that two years 
imprisonment. '" Coleman, 158 
F.3d at 203. The court noted that 
although the reasoning of the two 
opinions conflicted, the results 
reached in each did not. Id at 203 
n. 5. Based on the statutory 
language of section 921 (a)(20)(B), 
the court determined the critical 
inquiry to be "whether the offense 
was 'punishable' by a term of 
imprisonment greater than two 
years--not whether the offense 
'was punished' by such a term of 
imprisonment." !d. at 203-04. 
The court therefore concluded that 
Coleman's 1988 Maryland 
common-law assault conviction fit 
within the violent felony definition 
of the ACCA. Id. at 204. 
In the instant case, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit delineated the 
standard by which Maryland 
common-law assault convictions 
are to be assessed pursuant to the 
Armed Career Criminal Act of 
1984. Although classified as a 
misdemeanor by the State of 
Maryland, whether common-law 
assault is a violent felony is based 
on the element of use, attempted 
use, or threatened use of physical 
force and the potential length of 
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imprisonment. Further, to 
establish the physical force 
element, the court is permitted to 
review the charging documents of 
the offense and the affidavit 
establishing probable cause. This 
decision may prove detrimental to 
those individuals previously 
convicted of what they believed to 
be a misdemeanor, but who may 
now be facing enhanced penalties 
in the federal courts. Most 
importantly, the subjective 
physical force element permits 
judges to impose the mandatory 
fifteen year sentence in federal 
proceedings. With this decision, a 
defendant's constitutional right to 
counsel becomes all the more 
critical to ensure that any action 
taken at trial, specifically plea 
bargaining, is entered into 
knowingly and intelligently with 
the possibility of future 
ramifications fully explained. 
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